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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We enrich the research on income manipulation by establishing a link among companies’ price-setting control and 
the extent of real activities management. Examining three types of real activities management, the results reveal an 
interesting asymmetry in how companies employ income manipulation based on their pricing strength. We discover 
that companies with weaker price-setting clout employ larger manipulation of sales and production costs as a tool to 
manage income, while firms with more dominant pricing power prefer managing discretionary expenses.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 key matter in income manipulation investigation is to detect firm characteristics that determine 
income manipulation (see Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Firms can resort to two diverse types of income 
manipulations - accruals management and real activities manipulation. Extant income manipulation 
studies have concentrated on accruals management that involves the choice between accounting methods to 
manipulate reported income1, real activities management has not been studied as much. A few studies (Gunny, 2010; 
Zhang, 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006; Bartov, 1993) establish that management strategically manage operational 
decisions as an important tool for income manipulation. When managers choose to manage real activities, they make 
decisions to change the scheduling or configuration of underlying operational acts of the firm in order to manipulate 
reported income. 
 
Many papers have already shown that a company’s competitive setting impacts its capital budgeting, capital structure, 
dividends and risk management activities.2 However the influence of competition on the declared income is mainly 
unexamined. Arguably, a firm’s price-setting clout gives the company the capacity to organically smooth out cash 
flow fluctuations and reduce income volatility by passing on any cost increases to the consumers, hence lessening the 
necessity to manage income. In this study, we explore empirically the connection between price-setting clout of 
companies and their capacity of income manipulation via real activities management. In particular, we pursue the 
important and yet unanswered question. Does competition faced by companies impact the extent of income 
manipulation through real activities management?  
 
Although Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Singh (2013) relate the product market power to income management, their focus 
was on accruals management. This is the first paper to relate the pricing environment of a firm to its degree of real 
activities manipulation. By addressing the above issue, we add to the body of knowledge by establishing whether a 
company’s relative intra-industry pricing environment affects its decisions regarding the transparency or 
informativeness of its reported income.  
 
 
1 Prior research that document management through accruals include Abdallah and Hussain (2012), Saleh and Ahmed (2005), and Holland and 
Jackson (2004). 
2 E,g. , Grullon and Michaely (2007). 
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While firms may prefer real activities in certain situations, it is not clear what is the expected correlation between 
price-setting clout and the extent of income manipulation. On one hand, it can be argued that larger the capacity of 
firms with more price-setting clout to transfer production cost increases to consumers the lower the necessity to engage 
in income management. Alternatively, it can also be reasoned that managers of high market power firms are under 
relatively forgiving disciplinary environment, and hence enjoy greater discretion to manipulate income compared to 
their low market power firm counterparts. These two competing arguments create an interesting tension, making the 
compelling central issue examined in this study also an important empirical question. 
 
Using a large sample of 43,628 firm-year observations during 1987-2009, we find that price-setting clout is a 
significant factor of a firm’s degree of real activities manipulation. In particular, we document a strong association of 
price-setting clout and three types of real activities manipulation that are typically used in prior studies. We find that 
companies with low price-setting clout resort to sales manipulation and, hence their operating cash flows are 
considerably lesser than companies with higher price-setting clout. The analysis also reveals that companies with low 
price-setting clout have greater tendency to utilize production costs in an effort to reduce their costs of goods sold. 
This is in support of research that documents that management resort to manipulations since declaring worse than 
anticipated income is harshly punished by the Wall Street (Skinner & Sloan, 2002). These results echo the findings 
documented in Datta et al. (2013) that companies with low price-setting clout resort to more accrual manipulation. 
 
In contrast to these findings, firms with the strongest competitive market positions are more prone to manage 
discretionary (non-mandatory) expenses than firms with weaker market position. Overall, the analysis reveals an 
interesting asymmetry in how firms resort to income manipulations through real activities where firms with weak 
market positions favor engaging in manipulation of sales and manufacturing expenses as tools for income 
manipulation while companies with higher market power prefer managing discretionary (non-mandatory) expenses. 
After controlling for proxies of governance and information environment, our inferences regarding market power’s 
effect on real activities remains unaltered. 
 
In the next section, we present testable hypotheses relating product market power to real activities management. 
Section 3 shows the data used, and the measures to capture price-setting clout and income manipulation. The results 
connected with price-setting clout and real activities management are in Section 4. We conclude the paper in Section 
5. 
 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) documents that managers shape income by manipulating real activities through “channel 
stuffing” via quickening of sales, price discounts, reducing or delaying discretionary expenses, or overproducing. 
Surveys, conducted by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) among others, provide evidence that managers are more 
willing to employ   operational decisions management than accruals manipulation, perhaps since the latter is expected 
to attract the attention of watchdogs. Real activities management, on the other hand, is less discernible because these 
actions are more difficult to distinguish from normal business decisions. Another reason for not relying solely on 
accruals manipulation is that the magnitude of accrual-based strategies may not be sufficient to manage income to the 
desired level, whereas real activities management by its very nature have to be implemented before the end of the 
fiscal period.  
 
Intra-industry price-setting clout that we simply designate as price-setting clout stems from the company’s facility to 
get abnormal rents (higher prices) from its consumers without impacting sales, thus affording a pricing advantage to 
the firm vis-à-vis its industry rivals. Distinctiveness and preeminence of product lines or a solid trade name and 
innovative marketing strategies are the symbols of solid price-setting clout. Prior studies have found multiple 
advantages that firms derive from price-setting clout.   
 
First, companies with higher price-setting clout can better sustain their margins when they get external production 
cost increases since they have unique merchandise either or both marketing strategies. On the other hand, product 
substitutability magnifies price competition.3 Firms whose products could easily be substituted have lower capacity 
 
3 Intensity of price-related competitive pressures is enhanced with higher product substitutability (see Hotelling, 1929). 
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to increase prices, and by extension, an inability to pass on these costs to protect profit margins. The ability to maintain 
superior profit margins in the face of idiosyncratic shocks allows such firms to establish a strategic response to fend 
off new competitors.  
 
Second, superior financial performance may allow the firm greater access to capital markets, which can insulate it 
from the competition. The improved protection level of these companies in circumstances of cash shortages, enhances 
their ability to withstand worsening financial environment compared to companies with low price-setting clout. The 
improved cash-flow margin of safety turns into a lesser prospect of economic suffering and subsequent exit in response 
to production cost shocks. Given the above arguments, more price-setting clout allows companies to diminish 
insecurity about their expected cash-flows obviating the need for real activities management, while the pressures on 
firms without pricing power provide incentives for them to take recourse to more income manipulation.   
 
Another rationale that suggests a relationship between relative pricing strength and reporting quality is the proprietary 
costs faced by firms with intense price pressures. Verrecchia (1983) suggests that on account of negative effect from 
information transparency, such companies like less information revelation to decrease destructive pressures from 
competitors. Thus, it can be argued that income management can act as mechanism through which the firm 
strategically withholds valuable information from rivals thereby reducing the transparency of financial statements.  
 
We utilize three measures of real activities, namely, abnormal discretionary (non-mandatory) expenses, abnormal 
production costs and abnormal cash flows. Roychowdhury (2006) argues that to meet income benchmarks, managers 
can strategically influence income by reducing discretionary expenses, increasing production costs or increasing sales 
(which leads to lower cash flows).4 Sales manipulation involves behavior that accelerates revenue from upcoming 
year into the present year. While boosting sales, such manipulations also lower margins due to the lower prices and 
soft credit needed to enhance revenue beyond normal levels. This impacts the current period cash flow adversely. 
Thus, a company that manipulates increasing revenue now has a lower than normal cash flow. If product market power 
ameliorates (enhances) the need to manipulate income, then such firms will manage sales to a lesser (greater) extent, 
and hence, be less likely to experience reduction (increase) in less than normal cash-flow from operating activities. 
We also argue that companies with great price-setting clout are unlikely to enhance sales through offering price 
discounts as such action may undermine their brand value. 
 
Managers can also influence income-reducing discretionary expenses that temporarily boost reported income. There 
are various forms of non-mandatory costs like R&D expenditure, marketing expenditure, SG&A and maintenance 
expenses. For example, results in Roychowdhury (2006) support the view that firm management circumvent declaring 
losses by cutting discretionary spending. Bens, Nagar and Wong (2002) report that firm-management cut expenditure 
on R&D and capital budgeting spending whenever EPS decreases happen as result of ESOP conversion to shares. 
However, the directional relationship between market power and discretionary expenses is unclear. The firms with 
low market power can reduce these expenses to manage income upwards. However, to the extent, these firms have to 
rely on greater innovation through R&D as per Schumpeter’s (1912) argument or cannot afford to reduce advertising 
and sales expenses to survive in the tough market place, we expect these firms to manipulate discretionary expenses 
to a lesser degree than firms with greater market power. 
 
Further, managers can influence the expense related to COGS by overproducing, thereby spreading the constant 
indirect expenses over a greater quantity of output provided that carrying expenditures of inventory do not completely 
offset the benefit from manipulation. Recent work provides evidence that managers overproduce to decrease COGS 
(Thomas & Zhang, 2002; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny 2010). Specifically, we propose that if product market power 
insulates firms from the need to manipulate income, then such companies are unlikely to indulge in accelerating 
revenue, cutting their non-mandatory costs or increasing production. In addition to the extent the real activities could 
be managed to obfuscate information as argued in the theoretical model of Verrecchia (1983), the firms with low 
market power have more motivation to manipulate income. These above arguments lead to the following primary 
hypotheses: 
 
 
4 The section uses the basic arguments expanded in detail in Roychowdhury (2006). See Roychowdhury (2006) for in-depth analysis of how real 
activities could be used to influence income.  
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Hypothesis 1: Companies with weaker price-setting clout will exhibit more tendency to manipulate sales leading to 
lower abnormal cash flows.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Companies with weaker price-setting clout will exhibit more propensity to manage production costs 
leading to greater abnormal production costs. 
  
Hypothesis 3: Companies with weaker price-setting clout will exhibit more tendency to manage discretionary 
expenses leading to lower abnormal discretionary expenses.  
 
Theoretical studies have shown that the nature and intensity of the competition directly influences managerial behavior 
in an agency context. These studies suggest that competitive pressures themselves exert a corrective tool decreasing 
managerial dysfunctional behavior. Hart (1983) shows that when competitive pressures increase, firm-management 
have less leeway and are motivated to put in more efforts. Likewise, Hallström (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) 
posit that when cost shocks in an industry are correlated, amplified competitive pressures afford shareholders with 
greater information which helps reduce moral hazard problem. Schmidt (1997) argues that higher rivalry in the 
industry escalates the prospect of bankruptcy of the company due to reduced profits, therefore giving robust motivation 
to firm-management to exert more efforts to remain employed. The main thrust of this theoretical strand of literature 
is that lack of competition provides weak disciplinary environment to managers. Other theoretical work has formalized 
this notion by investigating the prospective avenues through which competitive pressures impact firm-management 
motivations. (Raith, 2003).  
 
A number of papers show that a company’s competitive setting impacts its capital budgeting, capital structure, 
dividends and risk-management decisions. Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2006) document the effect of competitive 
forces on risk-management strategies, and Grullon and Michaely (2007) provides evidence that competitive 
environment impacts the distribution of cash to shareholders. Guadalupe and Pérez-González (2010) document that 
the more intense competitive environment, the less the personal advantages of management control.5  
 
Prior empirical research also provides evidence that a feeble penalizing environs permits managers to indulge in 
greater income management (Bowen, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam, 2008).  By the same token, we argue that 
competitive disciplinary pressures may limit how much firms can manage real activities to manipulate their reported 
income. If competitive pressures are more effective at monitoring and disciplining management, then firms operating 
in such environments will exhibit lesser tendency to manipulate reported income. In contrast, companies operating in 
competitively more secure environments will manipulate income more.  
 
The informational disclosure literature gives another rationale for companies with great price-setting clout to manage 
income. While Verrecchia (1983) proposes that companies described by extreme competitive environment reveal a 
lesser amount of information, Stivers (2004) proves that the more information is revealed with more extreme 
competitive environment. Stivers contends that in competitive industries, there will be at least one company with 
quality high enough to reveal its information, thereby allowing for the progression of information revelation until full 
disclosure is attained.  
 
The above arguments provide backing to the premise that firms with high price-setting clout may have greater 
tendency to manage income via sales, overproduction, and discretionary expenses. Specifically, a firm with high 
market power can resort to lower prices or offer soft credit terms to manage revenue in the current year to drive out 
competitors from the market. One could also argue that companies with great price-setting clout can actually 
overproduce to manipulate income too since they are more likely to find customers to buy these products in the future 
unlike firms with weak product market power. Although firms with high market power can reduce discretionary 
expenses in the short run to influence income, they may be limited in this capacity for the following reasons. It may 
stand to reason that firms with high market power hold their superior pricing power because of the unique nature of 
their products, services, or brand image. These attributes may require higher expenditures on R&D, and sales and 
advertising making management of discretionary expenses difficult.  
 
5 Fama (1980), also argues that competitive environment can be effective in ameliorating corporate governance as competition motivates firm-
management to skip unnecessary expenditure and resources misallocation.   
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Hypothesis 1A: Firms with stronger product market pricing power will exhibit a greater propensity to manage sales 
which leads to higher abnormal cash flows.  
 
Hypothesis 2A: Firms with stronger product market pricing power will exhibit a greater propensity to manage 
production costs which leads to lower abnormal production costs.  
 
Hypothesis 3A: Firms with stronger product market pricing power will exhibit a greater tendency to manage 
discretionary expenses leading to higher abnormal discretionary expenses. 
 
Given these opposing predictions, the correlation between competition and non-mandatory expenses remains an 
empirical question.  
 
3. DATA AND MEASURES USED 
 
3.1. Data 
 
To begin with our sample includes all companies in the COMPUSTAT during 1987-2009. In addition companies 
should have data on Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) and be part of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ with 
share code from 10 to 19. We exclude firms with sales/assets smaller than $ 1 million, on-US firms, and firms that 
change their fiscal year during the sample period. Firms are assigned to different industries based on Fama-French 49 
industry classification. We drop financials (“Banks”, “Trading”, “Insurance”, and “Real Estate”) from our sample 
because of the differential nature of their financial statements and also eliminate utilities because they are subject to 
regulations. Finally, we include those firm-years with adequate data to calculate the real activities management 
variables. Using all the filters above, we obtain final sample of 43,628 firm-year observations with 6,019 unique firms.  
 
3.2. Measuring Firm-Specific Price-Setting Clout 
 
Following Gaspar and Massa (2006) and abundant industrial organization works (e.g. Lindenberg & Ross, 1981 etc.), 
we create our price-setting clout metric based on the Lerner Index (LI) (see Lerner, 1934) which is also denoted as the 
price-cost margin scaled by sales (PCM) measured as below:  
 𝑃𝐶𝑀 = 𝐿𝐼 = '()*+,-./','/&1'()*+  (1) 
 
Where Sales is COMPUSTAT variable, SALE, cost of goods sold, COGS, is COMPUSTAT variable, COGS, and 
sales, general and administrative expenses, SG&A, is COMPUSTAT variable, XSGA.  
 
To isolate the company-specific variables that impact price-setting clout from industry-wide factors, we calculate an 
adjusted metric of the Lerner Index. It is the value-weighted industry-adjusted Lerner Index (LIIA) measured as the 
difference between the company’s price-cost margin and the sales-weighted price-cost margin of the all companies 
within an industry as shown below: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 𝐿𝐼9 − ∑ 𝜔9𝐿𝐼9=9>?  (2) 
 
where LIi is the Lerner Index (as in equation (1) for company i, 𝜔9 is the fraction of revenue of company i to aggregate 
industry revenue where industry is categorized e according to Fama-French 49 Industry Classifications, and N is the 
number of companies in the industry. This adjusted Lerner Index metric measures the within-industry price-setting 
clout of a company.  
 
3.3. Measurement of Income Management 
 
Following Roychowdhury’s (2006) methodology, we first estimate the expected value of the variables and then derive 
the abnormal values associated with each of the three real activities variables. The first step involves running a 
regression for cross-section of firms in each industry and year with a minimum of 15 observations for each year 
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industry pair. This initial stage allows us to forecast the “normal” value of cash flow from operations, and non-
mandatory (discretionary) expenses. For each of these three variables we then calculate the abnormal component by 
taking away the forecasted component from the real value as found in dataset.   
 
To obtain an estimate of the normal operating cash flow, we estimate coefficients 𝛼A, 𝛼?, 𝛼B,	and 𝛼E in the following 
model. 
 -FGH1GHIJ = 𝛼A + 𝛼? ?1GHIJ + 𝛼B 'GH1GHIJ + 𝛼E ∆'GH1GHIJ + 𝜀9N (3) 
 
Here i indicates companies, t indicates time, CFit indicates the cash flow from operations (Compustat variable 
OANCF), Ait-1 is past value of assets (Dataset variable, AT), Sit is revenue (dataset, SALE), and ΔSit is the difference 
in revenue calculated as St-St-1. Cash flow from operations is identified from COMPUSTAT. Then for every firm-year, 
abnormal cash flow (ACF) is simply the actual cash flow minus the expected cash flow estimated from the coefficients 𝛼AO, 𝛼?O, 𝛼BO, and 𝛼EO, using the appropriate industry-year regression and company’s revenue and past value of assets.  
 
Abnormal discretionary expenses are similarly calculated where the actual discretionary expenses for the firm are 
subtracted from the normal discretionary expenses. The latter is computed as follows: 
 PQRS1GHIJ = 𝛼A + 𝛼? ?1GHIJ + 𝛼B 'GHIJ1GHIJ + 𝜀9N (4) 
 
Where DEXPit is non-mandatory expenses for company i in year t, and it is the sum of R&D, Advertising   and Selling, 
General and Administrative expenditures. The abnormal discretionary expenses (ADEXP) is computed as simply the 
actual non-mandatory expenditure minus the expected non-mandatory expenditure expenses based on the computed 
coefficients 𝛼AO, 𝛼?O,	and 𝛼BO using the appropriate industry-year regression and company’s difference in revenue and 
past value of assets. 
 
The abnormal production costs are similarly calculated where the actual discretionary expenses for the firm are 
subtracted from the normal discretionary expenses. The latter is computed as follows: 
 S-.'TGH1GHIJ = 𝛼A + 𝛼? ?1GHIJ + 𝛼B 'GHIJ1GHIJ + 𝛼E ∆'GH1GHIJ + 𝛼U ∆'GHIJ1GHIJ + 𝜀9N (5) 
 
Where 𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇9N = 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆9N + ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉9N. Then for every firm-year, abnormal real activities measure, 𝐴𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇, is simply 
the actual measure minus the normal measure computed with the forecasted coefficients 𝛼AO, 𝛼?O, 𝛼BO, 𝛼EO, and 𝛼UO from 
the appropriate industry-year regression and company’s revenue and past value of assets.  
 
3.4. Description of Dataset  
 
In Table 1 we show many relevant significant summary numbers. Variables are detailed in Appendix 1. The sample 
companies have a mean (median) market capitalization of $2,037 million ($193 million). Our typical firm is similar 
to Roychowdhury (2006) in terms of market capitalization ($137 million), while the median asset growth rate of 6.4 
percent for our sample is similar to that reported by Yu (2008) of 9 percent. Our typical company has a volatility of 
13.6 percent.  
 
The median Market Power for our sample is -3.44, the comparable statistic in Gaspar and Massa (2006) is -5.8. Next, 
we report the descriptive statistics related to real activities management. The median abnormal cash flow as a 
proportion of lagged total assets is 3.71 percent, while the comparable figures for abnormal discretionary expenses 
and product cost are -4.46 and 2.07 percent, respectively.  
 
In Table 2 we show the correlations between the important variables used in the examination. The correlations in 
general between company variables is slight. The association between abnormal cash flows and abnormal production 
cost, -0.09, suggests that, on a univariate basis, companies that manipulate cash flows may also manipulate production 
cost. Similar relationship is observed between abnormal non-mandatory expenditure and abnormal production cost 
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and between abnormal cash flows and abnormal non-mandatory expenditure. We find that abnormal discretionary 
expenses is positively associated with asset growth, volatility and market-to-book ratio indicating that firms described 
by growth opportunities and greater risk are unlikely to engage in manipulating discretionary expenses downward as 
this may entail adverse long-term ramifications. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1. Multivariate Analysis  
 
Here we look at the relationship between competition and real activities management in multiple regression, adjusting 
for company features revealed in the past studies, like the growth rate of assets, firm size, market-to-book ratio, 
leverage and volatility that have bearing on income manipulation. We use different formulations of the model given 
below for each of the three dependent real activities variables, ACF, ADEXP, and APCOST: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠N = βA + β?𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟dN + βB𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎdN + βE𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘dN + βU𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦dN + βh𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒dN +βj𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒dN + 𝜀d (6) 
 
where ACF is the abnormal operational cash flow, ADEXP is the abnormal non-mandatory expenditure, and APCOST 
is the abnormal production costs each scaled by past year lagged assets. We use year dummies to adjust for business 
cycle effects and industry dummies to control for differences across industries. The indexes i and t refer to company 
and time respectively.  We cluster all the standard errors at the company level. We report the results in Table 3. 
 
We use two representations for company growth because such companies are under more financial market pressure to 
manage their income (Lee, Li & Heng, 2006), namely, Growth and Market-to-book ratio. We adjust for company size 
for bigger companies are under greater vigil from analysts and are unlikely to indulge in income manipulation. 
 
Using a maximum of 43,628 firm-year observations, our study establishes a connection between price-setting clout of 
companies and their extent of real activities management used to manipulate reported income. Our findings reveal that 
price-setting clout has a significant role in ascertaining a firm’s degree of real activities manipulation based on three 
different metrics that are commonly used in the literature. Consistent with our univariate results and with hypothesis 
H1, we report in Model 1 that the coefficient of abnormal cash flow from operations (ACF) is positive, 0.249, and 
highly significant. It is in line with the idea that low pricing power companies indulge in greater income manipulation. 
In Model 2, which employs abnormal production costs (APCOST) as the dependent variable, the coefficient of Market 
Power is -0.201, in line with our hypothesis H2. Next, in Model 3, the coefficient on Market Power is -0.070 when 
abnormal discretionary expense (ADEXP) is the dependent variable. This result supports hypothesis H3A. The 
magnitudes of the three coefficients of Market Power reveal that firms with weak pricing power engage in much larger 
manipulations of real activities with regard to sales and production costs but are not able to do so with respect to 
discretionary expenses perhaps because much of these expenses are necessary for their survival. Whilst, companies 
with superior price-setting clout do not have to give sales discount or resort to overproduction to manage income. 
 
Overall, our multivariate analysis confirms the asymmetry in how firms resort to income manipulations through real 
activities as we find that weak market power firms are more inclined to manage sales and production costs while firms 
with higher market power prefer managing discretionary expenses and eschew sales manipulation that is often 
accompanied by price discounts that can dilute the value of the brand name. Taken together, the combination of our 
findings indicates that companies with lower price-setting clout strategically decide to indulge in more real activities 
management to impact reported income. 
 
4.2. Accounting for the Influence of Governance Mechanisms 
 
In this section, we introduce additional variables to our regression model to adjust for the likelihood that many 
governance devices could proxy the observed real activities management. To do so, we adjust for two outside 
governance entities that is institutional investors and sell-side analysts. Strict monitoring by these two informed capital 
market participants help improve the information environment of the companies and reduce the tendency for them to 
manipulate income (see Lang & Lundholm, 1996); Bushee, 1998; Yu, 2008).  If the scrutiny by outside entities can 
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replace the discipline pressure of competition, then relevance of our price-setting clout variable may reduce in their 
presence.  
 
The numbers reported in model 1, 4, and 7 of Table 4 confirm that the scrutiny by institutional investors does not 
influence managerial decisions to manipulate any of the three real activities in focus. However, the coefficients in 
Models 2, 5 and 8 indicate that analysts’ coverage impacts the extent to which real activities are manipulated. Model 
2 which shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient suggests that greater analysts following increases 
abnormal cash flows (ACF) while the significantly positive coefficients in Model 5 and 8 reflects that analysts’ 
coverage of the firm reduces abnormal production costs (APCOST) and discretionary expenses (ADEXP). More 
importantly, whether analysts following, or institutional holdings are included, market-setting clout stays significant 
suggesting that the influence of market-setting clout remains important even after controlling for monitoring by 
institutional investors and analysts. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Sharma (2011) examine whether financial analysts have 
more difficulty making forecasts for firms in more competitive environments (i.e. weaker pricing power). For such 
firms, they document that analysts’ income forecast errors are larger. Our study suggests that the difficulty of 
forecasting income in weak pricing environments could be due to a greater incidence of real activities management 
by such firms.6 
 
Past research shows a negative relationship between poor information environment of the company and its bid-ask 
spreads (Leuz & Verrechia, 2000). Therefore, in Models 3, 6 and 9, we adjust for company’s information setting by 
including the company’s bid-ask spread. The coefficient of Spread in Model 3 is positive while it is negative in Models 
6 and 9. The implication of these findings is that the higher the information asymmetry the greater the propensity to 
manipulate real activities. More importantly our main variable of interest Price-setting Clout remains highly 
significant in all the models.  
 
4.3 Controlling for the Effect of Internal Monitoring 
 
In this section, besides company characteristic variables, we adjust for internal governance factors. The results are 
shown in Table 5.  We utilize Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) GIM Index, that computes shareholder rights built 
on 24 provisions. A high value of GIM Index signifies poorer shareholder rights. Another variable that we employ to 
proxy for internal governance is the management compensation. Some papers demonstrate that management manage 
income to impact their bonuses (Guidry, Leone & Rock, 1999) and to profit from insider selling of their shares 
(Beneish & Vargus, 2002)7. We check the extent to which inside inducements move the impact of competitive lead in 
the industry, by incorporating the equity-based compensation as a portion of total CEO remuneration.  
 
GIM Index’s coefficient, which is included in Models 1, 3 and 5, is significant and positive only in Model 3 (explaining 
abnormal production costs) but our main variable, Price-setting clout, stays significant in the presence of this 
governance proxy variable. In an un-tabulated results, we use the E-Index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrel (2004) 
founded on 6 of the 24 provisions in the GIM index. Our results remain unchanged. The coefficient estimates on CEO 
EBC are insignificant except in Model 4 (explaining abnormal production costs) where it is negative. These findings 
imply that when management is more entrenched (high GIM index) and when equity incentives are low, there is a 
greater propensity to manage production costs. Nonetheless, our main variable of interest, Price-setting clout, remains 
significant. 
 
Generally, our results presented in the tables reliably indicate that companies that use real activities manipulation to a 
greater extent are relatively small, use less debt, and have greater growth and volatility. Previously, Minton and 
Schrand (1999) also document that companies with greater cash-flow volatility have greater costs of outside financing. 
Therefore, our result of a significant link between cash flow volatility and real activities manipulation suggests that 
companies with increased costly outside financing tend to manage income. Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) argue that 
 
6 Gunny (2010) ﬁnds that companies that barely beat income yardsticks by manipulating R&D or SG&A expenditures experience substantially 
greater future industry-adjusted ROA compared to companies that do not indulge in such activities while barely come up to income yardsticks. She 
concludes that real activities management is not opportunistic. Our results suggest that firms that have exhibited consistent profit-margin advantage 
are more likely to manage discretionary expenses and to a much lesser degree than weak product market firms manage other ingredients of real 
activities. Thus, results observed by Gunny do not necessarily imply that management of all real activities is not opportunistically motivated.  
7 Some more studies linking income manipulation to management compensation are Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), and Cheng (2004). 
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companies that use state-of-the-art equipment and knowhow experience greater disclosure expenses. This rational 
indicates that companies with higher market-to-book ratio are further worried about revealing information by means 
of their financial reporting and would tactically manipulate income to a greater extent. Our result of positive and 
significant coefficients on Market-to-Book supports this surmise.  
 
Finally, to check the robustness of our results and to circumvent any single-year abnormalities that may affect the 
variables, we re-estimate all our empirical results using a normalized Price-setting clout variable, All our inferences 
continue to hold to the use of a normalized Price-setting clout, computed  as the mean  of Price-setting clout (industry-
adjusted Lerner Index) during last three years.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using a large sample, we analyze three different metrics of real activities and find an interesting asymmetry in how 
firms resort to income manipulations through real activities. In particular, we find that firms with less dominant pricing 
power are more prone to engage in sales manipulation as a tool for income management. In contrast, firms with higher 
market power eschew sales manipulation that can entail discounts that dilute brand value. In addition, firms with weak 
product market positions have greater propensity to manage production costs in attempt to reduce cost of goods sold. 
However, firms with high pricing power favor managing discretionary spending which substantiates the idea that 
companies operating in tougher competitive environments have to be at the forefront of innovation and technological 
progress and therefore have less flexibility when it comes to R&D and marketing expenditures that are essential for 
firm viability. The asymmetry in real activities manipulation suggests that firms tailor their income manipulation to 
fit their product market profile. 
 
Our finding that firms with inferior product pricing positions are more likely to indulge in real activities manipulation 
that distort the true income picture suggests that income reported by such firms are relatively more opaque. Our 
evidence is broadly in supportive of Verrecchia’s (1983) argument that proprietary costs in competitive industries 
reduce incentives for transparency.   
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Asset Growth is computed as the difference in total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT) divided by past year assets. 
 
Bid-Ask Spread is calculated as mean of the daily closing (ask price-bid price)/closing price for each company in 
each year. 
 
CEO EBC is measured as the value of equity-based compensation ($ sum of granted options and restricted 
stockholdings) divided by aggregate CEO remuneration. 
 
GIM Index is an index computing shareholder rights developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) integrating 
24 governance provisions and state antitakeover law such as charter and bylaw provisions.  
 
Institutional holdings for each company is computed as the aggregate shareholding of all institutional investors 
recorded in the 13-F quarterly files distributed over the number of shares outstanding. Institutional shareholdings is 
assumed to remain constant during subsequent months till the next quarter holdings information becomes available.  
 
Leverage is computed as past one year total long-term debt (COMPUSTAT item DLTT) spread over total assets 
(COMPUSTAT item AT).  
 
Size is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied with market price of the share (CRSP files). 
 
Price-setting Clout calculated as Revenue (COMPUSTAT item sale) minus cost of goods sold (COMPUSTAT 
COGS) minus sales, general and administrative expenses (COMPUSTAT item XSGA) spread over revenue, which is 
industry-adjusted by subtracting sales-weighted price-cost margin of all companies within an industry. 
 
Market-to-book is   market capitalization divided by the book value of the firm (COMPUSTAT item CEQ). 
 
Number of Analyst is number of useable forecasts used to calculate average monthly income estimate for each 
company in summary IBES dataset. 
 
Volatility of sales is measured as the standard deviation of sales during past three-years divided by past year assets 
(COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research –January/February 2019 Volume 35, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 12 The Clute Institute 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table shows summary statistics for important variables of our dataset. We have grouped the descriptive statistics into four 
categories: company characteristics variables, Price-setting clout metric, industry competition metrics, and real activities 
manipulation measures. The statistics are founded on a maximum of 43,628 firm-year observations extracted from the merger of 
the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases for 1987-2009. These denote 6,019 unique companies spread over 36 industries constructed 
from Fama-French 49 Industry classification. All variables are described in Appendix 1. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS    
Size (in $ millions) 43,628 2037.70 192.77 8510.46 
Asset growth rate  43,628 0.172 0.064 0.574 
Market-to-book ratio 43,628 3.189 1.976 11.954 
Volatility of sales 39,675 0.211 0.136 0.244 
Leverage 43,508 0.158 0.107 0.170 
Institutional Holding % 41,176 43.65 41.53 29.79 
Number of Analysts 43,628 5.52 3.00 6.89 
GIM Index 13,109 9.033 9.000 2.758 
Average Bid-ask Spread  40,287 0.030 0.016 0.040 
CEO Equity Salary 9,535 0.416 0.431 0.297 
PRICE SETTING CLOUT MEASURES     
Price-setting Clout (%) 43,628 -12.20 -3.44 37.65 
REAL ACTIVITIES MANAGEMENT     
Abnormal Cash Flow/Assetst-1 (%) 43,628 5.23 3.71 68.94 
Abnormal non-mandatory  Expenditure /Assetst-1 (%) 43,628 -0.7 -4.56 45.82 
Abnormal Production cost/Assetst-1 (%) 43,628 2.60 2.07 38.76 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix of Firm Characteristics and Real Activities Management  
 
This table shows correlations of some important company variables of our dataset and the three metrics f real activities management. 
The statistics are founded on a maximum of 43,628 firm-year observations extracted from the merger of the COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP databases for 1987-2009.All variables are described in Appendix 1. Correlations in bold signify significance at the 1% level 
or better.  
 
Variables ACF APCOST ADEXP Volatility Growth Market-to-Book Size Leverage 
ACF 1.00 -0.09 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00  0.04 
APCOST  1.00 -0.18 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
ADEXP   1.00 0.12 0.12 0.12  0.05 -0.04 
Volatility     1.00 0.34 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 
Growth     1.00 0.05  0.02  0.03 
Market-to-Book      1.00  0.03 0.00 
Size       1.00 0.02 
Leverage        1.00 
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Table 3. Market Power and Real Activities Management 
 
This table shows the findings of OLS regressions probing the influence of Price-setting clout on various real activities measures. 
The statistics are founded on a maximum of 43,628 firm-year observations extracted from the merger of the COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP databases for 1987-2009.The dependent variables are: the abnormal cash flows (ACF), abnormal production cost (APCOST) 
and abnormal discretionary expenses (ADEXP) (described in the text). All variables are described in Appendix 1.P-values shown 
in the parentheses are calculated with standard errors controlled for company-level clustering.  
 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables 
ACF APCOST ADEXP 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Price-setting Clout   0.249 (<0.00) 
-0.201 
(<0.00) 
-0.074 
(<0.00) 
Growth 0.143 (0.90) 
-2.476 
(0.00) 
10.923 
(<0.00) 
Log (Market-to-Book)/100 -0.394 (0.45) 
-6.841 
(<0.00) 
9.243 
(<0.00) 
Size/1000 8.402 (0.00) 
11.375 
(<0.00) 
-28.976 
(<0.00) 
Leverage -10.036 (<0.00) 
18.378 
(<0.00) 
-25.406 
(<0.00) 
Volatility/100 -8.470 (<0.00) 
15.795 
(<0.00) 
8.037 
(<0.00) 
Constant 0.0322 (0.00) 
0.0322 
(0.00) 
-0.028 
(0.31) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 39,563 39,563 39,563 
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Table 4. Market Power, Real Activities Management and Firm’s Information Environment 
 
This table shows the findings of OLS regressions exploring the influence of price-setting clout on various real activities measures. 
The statistics are founded on a maximum of 43,628 firm-year observations extracted from the merger of the COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP databases for 1987-2009. The abnormal cash flow (ACF), the abnormal production expenses (APCOST) and the abnormal 
non-mandatory expenditure (ADEXP) (defined in the text). All other variables are described in Appendix 1. P-values shown in the 
parentheses are calculated with standard errors controlled for company-level clustering. 
 
Independent Variables ACF APCOST Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Price-setting clout  0.249 (<0.00) 
0.250 
(<0.00) 
0.249 
(<0.00) 
-0.200 
(<0.00) 
-0.203 
(<0.00) 
-0.199 
(<0.00) 
Institutional Holdings 0.006 (0.70) 
  -0.021 
(0.15) 
  
Log (1+Num of analyst)/100  1.675 (0.00) 
  -2.821 
(<0.00) 
 
Bid-Ask Spread/100   0.331 (<0.00) 
  -0.154 
(0.04) 
Growth 0.082 (0.94) 
0.235 
(0.83) 
0.277 
(0.81) 
-2.463 
(0.00) 
-2.631 
(0.00) 
-2.576 
(0.00) 
Log (Market-to-Book)/100 -0.552 (0.32) 
-0.267 
(0.60) 
-0.620 
(0.28) 
-6.916 
(<0.00) 
-7.055 
(<0.00) 
-6.821 
(<0.00) 
Size/1000 8.535 (0.00) 
1.332 
(0.64) 
13.706 
(<0.00) 
12.468 
(<0.00) 
23.278 
(<0.00) 
9.445 
(<0.00) 
Leverage -9.963 (<0.00) 
-10.412 
(<0.00) 
-10.062 
(<0.00) 
18.857 
(<0.00) 
19.011 
(<0.00) 
-18.268 
(<0.00) 
Volatility/100 -9.081 (<0.00) 
-8.685 
(<0.00) 
-8.846 
(<0.00) 
16.244 
(<0.00) 
16.157 
(<0.00) 
16.132 
(<0.00) 
Constant 0.029 (0.08) 
0.002 
(0.84) 
0.030 
(0.01) 
-0.010 
(0.65) 
0.021 
(0.34) 
-0.019 
(0.35) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 37,388 39,563 39,408 37,388 39,563 39,408 
 
Independent Variables ADEXP Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Price-setting clout  -0.074 (<0.00) 
-0.073 
(<0.00) 
-0.070 
(<0.00) 
Institutional Holdings 0.023 (0.12) 
  
Log (1+Num of analyst)/100  -2.232 (<0.00) 
 
Bid-Ask Spread/100   -0.231 (0.01) 
Growth 10.954 (<0.00) 
11.046 
(<0.00) 
10.757 
(<0.00) 
Log (Market-to-Book)/100 9.744 (<0.00) 
9.412 
(<0.00) 
9.573 
(<0.00) 
Size/1000 -31.784 (<0.00) 
-38.393 
(<0.00) 
-34.041 
(<0.00) 
Leverage -26.298 (<0.00) 
-25.907 
(<0.00) 
-24.874 
(<0.00) 
Volatility/100 8.023 (<0.00) 
7.750 
(<0.00) 
8.089 
(<0.00) 
Constant -0.050 (0.10) 
-0.067 
(0.02) 
-0.036 
(0.21) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 37,388 39,563 39,408 
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Table 5. Price-setting Clout, Real Activities Management And Governance 
 
This table shows the findings of OLS regressions inspecting the impact of price-setting clout on various real activities measures. 
The statistics are founded on a maximum of 43,628 firm-year observations extracted from the merger of the COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP databases for 1987-2009.The abnormal non-mandatory expenditure is defined in the text. All other variables are described 
in Appendix 1. P-values shown in the parentheses are calculated with standard errors controlled for company-level clustering. 
 
Independent Variables ACF APCOST ADEXP Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Price-setting clout   0.238  (0.00) 
0.307 
(0.01) 
-0.218 
(<0.00) 
-0.225 
(<0.00) 
-0.067 
(0.00) 
-0.059 
(0.04) 
GIM Index/100 0.049 (0.81) 
 0.477 
(0.01) 
 -0.070 
(0.71) 
 
CEO EBC  -0.329 (0.88) 
 -3.704 
(0.007) 
 0.764 
(0.59) 
Growth 0.893 (0.83) 
-1.066 
(0.77) 
-4.558 
(0.00) 
-5.739 
(<0.00) 
10.496 
(<0.00) 
8.577 
(<0.00) 
Log (Market-to-Book)/100 2.244  (0.03) 
1.546 
(0.32) 
-8.848 
(<0.00) 
-9.292 
(<0.00) 
9.005 
(<0.00) 
7.961 
(<0.00) 
Size/1000 5.580 (0.19) 
12.010 
(0.04) 
20.650 
(<0.00) 
25.792 
(<0.00) 
-39.718 
(<0.00) 
-35.820 
(<0.00) 
Leverage -15.479 (0.00) 
-17.172 
(0.03) 
26.649 
(<0.00) 
28.208 
(<0.00) 
-33.976 
(<0.00) 
-30.775 
(<0.00) 
Volatility of Sales/100 -12.430 (0.00) 
-3.100 
(0.44) 
21.364 
(<0.00) 
22.609 
(<0.00) 
1.991 
(0.58) 
8.466 
(0.03) 
Constant -0.013 (0.55) 
0.070 
(0.04) 
-0.085 
(0.01) 
-0.084 
(0.01) 
0.025 
(0.52) 
0.053 
(0.16) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs. 13,013 9,282 13,013 9,282 13,013 9,282 
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NOTES 
